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Of the three European Communities, the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) is probably the least well understood. Its creation was not as historically significant as that of
the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.); moreover,
its operations receive less publicity than those of the Common
Market. Nonetheless, its institutions are unique in a number of
ways, and their operations have contributed greatly to a growing
body of law illustrating the increasingly federal nature of Europe.
The impact of Euratom upon the jurisprudence of Europe
will undoubtedly continue to expand as the energy crisis worsens.'
Within the recent past, the Court of Justice of the European Communities reached a decision concerning one of the institutions
of Euratom which, in a broad sense, is of great significance to
the continuing general development of European institutions. This
article is intended to analyze that decision with a view to reaching
conclusions regarding its impact upon the emerging "constitutional" nature of the Communities.
Specifically, the nature of Euratom and its unique subsidiary
institution, the Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy
Community will be examined. A discussion of Commission
of the European Communities v. France2-a case in which the
permanent competence of the Supply Agency was challengedwill follow. With the principles developed by the case in mind,
attention will be directed to the manner in which the competence
of European institutions is now being accepted as "preemptive"
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Law; LL.M., Georgetown University.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and are

not intended to reflect the opinion of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
1. For an early analysis of the need to coordinate all European energy
resources, see Van derEsch, Legal Aspects of a European Energy Policy, 2
COMM. MKT. L.R. 139 (1964).

2. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 453 (1972) (Case 7/71, December 14, 1971).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

1

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

in nature, without regard to the level at which that competence
is exercised within the Communities.
I.

EURATOM AND ITS SUPPLY AGENCY

Euratom, established by one of the 1957 Treaties of Rome,'
shares many of the characteristics of the other Communities. Since
the Merger Treaty, Euratom has also shared certain of the major
institutions of the other Communities. As with the other Communities:
Euratom can be defined as a union of sovereign states, based
upon an international treaty, with institutions of its own, acting
independently from the Member States,....4
Like the other Communities, Euratom has been endowed with
a "supranational" nature in the sense that it is a "public authority
which exists and operates directly within the Member States without the need for intervention by the national authorities of those
5
States."1
Even though Euratom is essentially similar to the other two
Communities in broad outline, it is markedly different in two
respects. It is these two differences which justified the creation
of a separate atomic energy community in the beginning.
The first difference is that, unlike the case with the E.E.C.
or the E.C.S.C., Euratom is endowed with a strong "promotional"
role in the development and control of a specific commodity.
Thus, in addition to those functions normally exercised by the
other Communities, Euratom administers and fosters the production and use of nuclear materials and services within the Member
States. These promotional functions are clearly established in
article 2 of the Treaty:
For the attainment of its aims, the Community shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Treaty:
(a) develop research.
(c) facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging business enterprise, the construction of the basic
3. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter cited as Euratom
Treaty].
4. Mathijsen, Problems Connected with the Creation of Euratom, 26 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 438 (1961).
5. Glaesner, The European Atomic Energy Community, in INTERNATIONAL
ATo Ic ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LAW FOR A DEVELOPING WORLD (1969).
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facilities required for the development of nuclear energy
within the Community,
(d) ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear
fuels to all users in the Community. ....
.

For the purpose of carrying out this promotional role, the Community has established numerous research centers, laboratories
and other cooperative projects.
A second manner in which Euratom is unique is in its relations with countries outside the Community:
While the Coal and Steel Treaty is practically silent on the
question of international agreements, the E.E.C. Treaty has
empowered the Economic Community to conclude agreements
with other States onfy when the Treaty explicitly provides.
Euratom, on the other hand, has received a general power to
enter into agreements with third countries, or international
organizations, concerning matters which fall within its compe7
tence.
As a result of this grant of power, there exists an international
organization which is authorized to act not only through its members, but can also act to bind its members vis-t-vis third countries.' This is without question a significant limitation of sovereignty by the Members and it is somewhat comparable to the
power granted to the United States Federal Government to conduct the foreign relations for the individual states. Conversely,
this is a significant advance over previous powers possessed by
comparable international organizations.
These two unique aspects of Euratom are highlighted
through its role of promoting the supply of nuclear materials to
the Member States, including supplies from third countries. This
role is the primary function of the Euratom Supply Agency.
The institutional nature of the Supply Agency is clearly delineated by article 54 of the Euratom Treaty which states that
it: "shall have legal personality and financial autonomy."9 Thus,
the Agency is a "corporate body vested with financial independence," 10 and is designed to be operated as an on-going business
6. Euratom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
7. Mathijsen, Some Legal Aspects of Euratom, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 327,
334 (1966). The external relations of the Community are dealt with in Chapter

X of Title Two of the Treaty, Articles 101-106.
8. This institution and these functions are detailed in Chapter VI of Title
Two, Articles 52-76 of the Treaty.
9. Euratom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 54.
10. 1 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 13938 [Para. 8407].
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operation pursuant to its charter. 1 ' However, the Agency is responsible to the superior institutions of the Communities:
The Agency, although it has legal personality, and financial
autonomy, is placed under the control of the Commission
which issues directives to it and possesses a right of veto over
,,12
its decisions ....
Thus, the nature of the Supply Agency is really that of a
secondary institution, or one of a lower order than the Council
and the Commission; it is "a means put at the disposal of the
Commission" in order to carry out the Commission's duties.1"
In more analytical terms, it has been suggested that the provisions
of the Treaty concerning the Supply Agency are of "a different
juridical dignity, [and are] reduced to a lower class" than those
establishing the other institutions.' 4
It is this secondary, or subsidiary nature of the Supply Agency
which is crucial to understanding the importance of the European
Court's judgment affirming the permanence and preeminence of
this institution in Europe. Before examining the situation which
led to that decision, it is necessary to explore the functions of
the Agency in more detail.
As previously noted, one of the primary functions of Euratom is to "ensure a regular and equitable supply" of nuclear materials to users in the Community. In order to accomplish this
goal, article 52.2(b) mandates the establishment of a Supply
Agency, and grants to the Agency:
[A] right of option on all ores, source materials and special
fissionable materials produced in the territories of the Member
States and . . . the exclusive right of concluding contracts
relating to supplies of ores, source materials and special
fissionable materials coming from inside or from outside the
Community. 15
11. Article 54 of the Treaty provides for this Charter in the form of a
Statute which is to "determine the particulars of the commercial management
of the Agency."
12. Mathijsen, supra note 7 at 334. See also, Euratom Treaty, supra note
3, art. 54.
13. See Mathijsen, supra note 7.
14. Reuter, Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the European Regional
Communities, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 381 (1961). In his analysis, the author
cites as examples of his contention the simplified procedures for modifying
the rules set forth in the Treaty concerning ownership of nuclear material, and
safety control.
15. Euratom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 52.2(b).
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The subsequent articles, setting forth more detailed provisions
for implementing the Agency's supply function, make it clear
that this Agency is "responsible for the entire supply [of nuclear
materials] of the territory of Euratom, [and has] an import and
export monopoly to all countries outside the Community.""6
At the time this supply regime was established, there was
within Europe, and in the rest of the world, a limited market
for nuclear materials. Nuclear power for use in commercial applications was still of an experimental nature but loomed large
in the minds of its proponents. Accordingly, in setting up the
supply regime, the Member States were working in a vacuum."
Experience acquired through a number of years of practice led
to certain operational changes, including the granting of permission to private users within the Community to contract directly
with each other. "Only with respect to contracts concluded with
parties outside the Community has the exclusive right of the
The reason for granting the right
Agency not been modified." '
to contract directly was that the supply of nuclear material within
Euratom, originally believed to be far smaller than the demand,
proved to be vastly larger than anticipated.
The drafters of the Treaty were apparently not successful
in predicting the precise nature of the demand for nuclear materials in Europe. They were, however, sufficiently aware of the
potential problem to include special rules for modification of these
supply provisions in the Treaty. Article 76 of the Treaty provides
a simplified procedure for amendment with respect to the supply
provisions. This article permits the Council, by means of a unanimous vote taken after consulting the Assembly, to implement
16. Bohm, Ownership of Nuclear Materials in Euratom, 11 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 167, 172 (1962).
17. "This body of provisions relating to supply, control and ownership has
been established a priori, as it has not been possible to make reference to any
experience in this field in several Member States," Gaudet, Euratom. 1 L. &
ADM. 140, 171 (1960).
18. Glaesner, supra note 5, at 44. It should be noted that the Treaty
provisions establishing the exclusive right of the Agency to contract were
based upon "the fundamental principle" of "equal access to nuclear materials."
Id. at 40. This can be contrasted with the legal situation which existed in
the United States in 1958; under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, "all right,
title and interest in or to any special nuclear material . . . shall be the property
" (Section 52). Thus, private U.S. individuals were
of the United States ..
permitted to conclude agreements among themselves for supply of nuclear material, although title to such material was in the U.S. Government.
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a proposal of the Commission (or of a Member State) to amend
the supply provisions of the Treaty. Article 76 then states:
The Council may, at the end of a period of seven years after
the date of entry into force of this Treaty, confirm these
[supply] provisions in toto. Failing such confirmation, new
provisions dealing with the subject-matter of this Chapter shall
be laid down in accordance with the procedure set out in
the preceding paragraph. 19
Despite the authority contained in this provision of the
Treaty, no amendment to the supply provisions has ever been
adopted. Practical modifications have been implemented; but no
amendment or confirmation has ever been adopted with respect
to the right to contract for materials coming from outside the
six Member States. Under the terms of article 76, confirmation
or revision of the supply provisions was to have occurred by January 1, 1965 (seven years after entry into force of the Treaty).
As a result, the process set forth in article 76 has never been
utilized in the fashion contemplated by the drafters.
In spite of this inaction, the supply provisions of the Treaty
continued to be applied after 1965.20 Even a cursory reading
of article 76 indicates that in the absence of such action, the
continued validity of Chapter VI after 1965 was open to question.
II.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES V. FRANCE

Acting in accordance with article 76 of the Euratom Treaty,
the Commission in November 1964, proposed to the Council certain amendments to Chapter VI of the Treaty. No further action
was taken as a result of this proposal. 2 Following expiration of the seven-year period stated in the Treaty, the Supply
Agency continued to exercise its functions as before. It is of
interest to note that France consistently maintained that these
authorizing provisions of the Treaty did not have continuing validity beyond 1964.22
19. Euratom Treaty, supra note 3, art. 76.
20. Glaesner, supra note 5, at 44.
21. "[O]wing to the complexity of the problem, particularly the divergence
of interests involved, the Council has not yet taken a decision on these proposals."
Id.
See Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 453, 455 (1972).
22. "[A]ccording to one opinion put forward during the relevant discussions, the provisions of Chapter VI have lapsed for want of a decision by the
Council. In practice, however, Chapter VI continues to be applied." Glaesner,
supra note 5, at 44.
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In accordance with its view of the legal situation, the French
Government (through the mechanism of the French Atomic
Energy Commission, or C.E.A.) advised French state and private
enterprise that Chapter VI of the Treaty, and with it the institution of the Euratom Supply Agency, no longer had binding effect
or authority. Following this notification, the C.E.A. concluded
a number of direct contracts with overseas suppliers of nuclear
materials. In so doing, the C.E.A. ignored the express provisions
of article 64 of the Treaty.
Upon learning of this action by France in apparent contravention of the Treaty, the Commission of the European Communities began taking the steps necessary to establish a violation of
the Treaty pursuant to article 141.23 With France's failure to
correct their alleged Treaty violation, the Commission referred
the case to the European Court of Justice in 1970.
The basic issue raised in the case was whether France was
in violation of its Treaty obligations. It is clear that this is an
issue which, in its most limited sense, is a problem of treaty interpretation. Had the Court resolved it purely as a matter of Treaty
interpretation, the case would be of little impact. However, the
Court's decision involved a number of issues and statements
which went far beyond mere questions of interpretation.
These transcendant issues involve three general areas: first,
the nature of the European Communities as supreme within
Europe, or their "constitutional" nature; second, the emerging
rule of "preemption" within Europe, or the doctrine that a function once delegated to the Community is no longer properly exercised by the individual States; and third, the rule, which emanates
from the first two doctrines, that Community institutions of any
order are, absent contrary provisions in their charters, of permanent duration and competence.
23. Article 141 provides:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill
any of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion
on the matter after requiring such State to submit its comments.
If such State does not comply with the terms of such opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may refer the matter
to the Court of Justice.

In 1969, the Commission, in a letter to CEA, stated its opinion that the contracts
concluded by CEA were in violation of the Treaty.

In reply, the French main-

tained their position that the provisions of Chapter VI had elapsed. After more
discussion, the Commission, in 1970, issued a formal opinion in which the
French were given 45 days to comply with the decision,
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In addition to these three areas, the case is significant for
a procedural argument which unfortunately was inadequately
dealt with in the decision. The absence of a full discussion of
this issue is of importance in analyzing the full scope of the decision. Before analyzing the major implications of the case, it
is first necessary to briefly summarize the holdings of the case
which are of more narrow interest.
The French Government's major argument was that the provisions of Chapter VI, which give the Supply Agency the exclusive
right to contract for the supply of nuclear materials coming from
outside Euratom, had lapsed by virtue of the failure of the Commission to adopt new provisions or confirm the old. Indeed,
a reading of the relevant language of article 76 does not clearly
establish the invalidity of this proposition. The "official resume"
of the Euratom Treaty, in analyzing the amending-confirming
language of article 76 contains the following statement:
On the expiry of a period of seven years from the entry into
force of the Treaty, the Council may confirm all these provisions. If they are not confirmed, fresh provisions will be
24
adopted in conformity with the above procedure.
The language of the Treaty is therefore clearly not disposi25
tive of the issue. As pointed out by Advocate General Roemer,
the conflicting language translations add to the uncertainty of
the words used in the treaty. For example, while the German
and Dutch versions "clearly show that Chapter VI cannot have
ceased to apply from January 1, 1965, '26 the French and Italian
27
versions "are less clear."
In view of the ambiguities inherent in the language, the
Court did not attempt to rest its decision solely on principles
of Treaty interpretation. Rather, it ventured into the realm of
the purpose, intent, and scope of the authority granted by the
Treaty. Following these guidelines, the Court held that the failure of the Commission to confirm or replace the old provisions
did not result in a lapse of Community authority:
[U]ntil the decision is made whether to make the existing
provisions permanent or to replace them with new provisions,
24. 1 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 13939 (Para. 8407) [emphasis added].
25. Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 460 (1972).
26. Id.

27. Id.
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the provisions of Chapter VI are merely preserved temporarily ....28
This holding was based upon a view of the European Communities which is of a "constitutional" nature. Moreover, it rested
firmly upon the doctrine that primary or secondary powers properly exercised by Community institutions are preempted by their
institutions. Finally, it was based upon the notion that the institutions created by the six Member States are permanent and sovereign.
HI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The European Communities have displayed attributes of sov29
ereignty since their creation by the Treaties of Rome.
[B]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its
own institutions, its own personality and its own capacity in
law, apart from having international standing and more
particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation of competence or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States, albeit within limited spheres,
have restricted their sovereign rights and created a body of
30
law applicable both to their nationals and to themselves.
This creation of new sovereign institutions and powers quite obviously gives the enabling treaties an area of constitutionality, since
each of them "instituted its own legal order, integrated into the
legal system of the member-States and which has priority before
' 31
their courts."
The sovereign or constitutional nature alluded to above has
been well established for the E.E.C. and presumably the E.C.S.C.
through prior decisions of the European Court of Justice. The
same was not true of Euratom until the instant case arose. As
stated by the Advocate General in the case of Commission of
the European Communities v. France "an organ of the Communities and a member-State are in dispute for the first time regarding
questions of Euratom law." 2 Therefore, although broad principles had been articulated for the Communities in general, no
28. Id., at 475.
29. March 25, 1957.

30. Costa v. E.N.E.L. (Case 6/64), cited in STrN &

HAY,

LAW AND

204 (1967).
31. Wilhelm, et. al. v. Bundeskartellamt, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100, 119
(1969).
32. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 453, 454 (1972).

INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA
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detailed analysis of this principle had ever before been brought
to bear upon Euratom, and more particularly, its unique institution of the Supply Agency.
A.

The ConstitutionalSovereignty of the Communities

As the prime justification for its holding in favor of the
Commission in this case, the Court of Justice made the following
statement concerning the European Atomic Energy Community:
The member-States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, equipped with permanent institutions invested with real powers resulting from a limitation of competences or a transfer of the powers of the States to this
33
Community.
Thus, the Court confirmed that which previously was implied
from the sweeping language of earlier decisions respecting the
other Communities. The institutions of Euratom created by the
Member States are independent, constitutionally endowed entities
whose "legal order is complete in itself." 4
The legal order created by the Euratom Treaty appears to
be broader in scope than those which have been created in connection with previous international organizations. 3 Probably the
clearest example of this newly developed scope of authority in
the Euratom Treaty is the ability of the organization to bind
the Member States in the matter of commercial arrangements for
the acquisition and supply of nuclear materials. This authority
constitutes more than an ability to implement decisions of the
Member States; it is a grant of the power to act independently
of the States in a fashion which binds those sovereign entities.
As characterized by the Advocate General, this power is a "compulsory centralization of supply . . . and demand .. ,6 and
33. Id., at 475.
34. Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal
Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695, 722 (1966): "The completeness of the Community legal

order is apparent from the fact that it consists of an independent and legally
autonomous system comparable to a constitution. It is not merely an accumulation of mutual rights and obligations of the founding States, the maintenance

of which requires constant recourse either to municipal law
ments of international law ..
"
35.

. . .

or to instru-

"Where similar organizations have existed in the past, they were not

only rudimentary and embryonic but also so shortlived and so specialized that
they cannot be compared with the Communities." Id. at 736.
36. Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 454 (1972)..
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quite clearly involves authority which traditionally is exercised
7
by the individual States.1
This unique nature of the institutions of the Atomic Energy
Community, and their constitutional basis, are strikingly evident
in the developing doctrine of "implied powers" within Euratom
and other European Communities. While it is true that the broad
mandate given to Euratom in the field of supply and demand
is particularly helpful in developing such a doctrine, it should
be noted that any derogation of a State's sovereignty in favor
of an international body has been construed narrowly. For this
reason, any broadening of the authority of an international body
to act independently of its sovereign creators would constitute
a significant advance in the direction of internationalism.
In the area of supply of nuclear materials, and in the development of nuclear research within Europe, the Atomic Energy
Community has acted to the fullest extent necessary to assert the
authority contained in the Treaty. The ability to expand the
institution's authority was recognized in the instant case by the
European Court in its characterization of article 2(d) of the
Treaty.3 8 The court held it to be "a general obligation imposed
on the institutions of the Community [which] is precisely to permit the supply system to be adopted to the evolution of circumstances. ' 39 This process of expansion of institutional authority
beyond the narrow limits of the words of the Treaty is one hallmark of a dynamic institutional structure. Recognition of the
expansion by the European Court gives added impetus to the
growth of the "implied powers" of each of the Communities.4"
37. "Unlike the institutions of practically all international organizations,
those of the Community are not mere liaison offices where Member Governments meet from time to time to discuss the conclusion of international agreements or a procedure to be pursued jointly at the national level." Sasse, supra
note 34, at 722.
38. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
39. Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 475 (1972).
40. See Collinson, The Foreign Relations Powers of the European Communities: A Comment on Commission v. Council, 23 STAN. L. REv. 956 (1971).
In his analysis of the case, the author makes the following conclusions:
mhe Court declared that the existence of Community external affairs
powers did not depend exclusively on specific provisions [of the Treaty]
but could also be founded on more general provisions interpreted in
light of the Treaty's overall system. . . . Id., at 965.
and that:
[A] Community external relations power may be founded on provisions
other than . . . specific foreign affairs provisions. . . . Id., at 967.
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The general constitutional nature of the institutions of Euratom, recognized in the case of Commission of the European
Communities v. France, is demonstrated by the developing concept of implied powers of these institutions. It is in another
aspect of institutional competence, however, that this sovereign
nature of the Communities is even more clearly defined.
B.

The Permanence of Preempted Powers

One of the most characteristic attributes of a federal system
is that the federal power has preemptive authority in exercising
the functions delegated to it. This attribute has been developed
strongly in the United States, and is now emerging in Europe.
The doctrine of preemption is a corollary of the doctrine of
implied powers discussed above. As a federal institution acts
to the full limit of its capacity, it correspondingly reduces the
jurisdiction of its constituent States.
The principle of preemption has been recognized within
Europe from the time Communities' Treaties entered into force:
The division of powers between the [European Economic]
Community and the Member States thus means that the
States cease to be competent whenever their competence is
excluded by some provision of the Treaty or whenever the
41
Communities have exercised their powers.
For example, one area of Community law where the doctrine
of preemption is well developed is in anti-trust law, where the
rule is firmly established that "conflicts between the Community
rule and the national rules . . . should be resolved by the appli42
cation of the principle of the primacy of the Community rule.
While this rule has been said to be "part of that solidly
entrenched body of law applied in [all] comparable cases,"4 3
it had never been applied by the Court of Justice to the institutions of Euratom prior to the case of Commission of the European Communities v. France.
In holding that the provisions of Chapter VI of the Euratom
Treaty did not lapse upon the expiration of the first seven-year
period, the Court of Justice concluded that acceptance of such
a lapse "would mean accepting a break of continuity in a field
41. Sasse, supra note 34 at 745.
42. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100, 119 (1969).
43. Sasse, supra note 34, at 717.
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which the Treaty . . . has provided for the pursuit of a common
policy."' 4 4 An analysis of the reasons for this refusal to accept
a break in continuity reveals that it is based upon two factors:
first, that the experimental nature of Euratom's mandate indicates
an intention to oust the individual States of competence; second,
that the nature of the supply regime created by the Treaty requires
uniform application throughout Europe.
At the time of entry into force of the Euratom Treaty's supply regime, it was believed that this new form of energy would
rapidly develop into a major industry. It was therefore necessary
to develop an ongoing mechanism to ensure that the expansion
was orderly and in the best interests of all Member States. Thus,
the provisions of the Treaty were "linked to a certain stage of
'4
development of industrial and legal techniques." ,
By the late 1960's, it was clear that the rapid growth of
nuclear energy forecasted by the drafters had not occurred; however, the original supply regime had not been altered to meet
these changed circumstances. Accordingly, France argued that
since the Treaty had not been amended in order to insert provisions
appropriate to the actual situation "it must be assumed that the
'46
original provisions ceased to have effect.
In its opinion, the Court of Justice brushed aside this argument by noting that in a situation where an experimental regime
has been established, it is "obviously difficult" to impose upon
that experiment an absolute duty to prove itself within a set period. 47 The court therefore refused to find that there was a lapse
in the competence of the Supply Agency such as to permit
a Member State to resume the exercise of that competence.
This conclusion reinforces the preeminence of the authority
of Community institutions. In spite of the fact that the authority
of the Supply Agency was originally seen as experimental and
subject to alteration, and in spite of the fact that the circumstances
were such that an alteration was in order, the Court refused to
permit any erosion of the authority of the Supply Agency.
The second factor supporting the Court's decision, as it re44. Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 475 (1972).
45. Gaudet, supra note 17, at 171.

46. Commission on the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 459 (1972).

47. Id., at 460.
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lates to preemption, was the need for uniform application of
the Community laws concerning use and control of atomic energy.
Uniformity, of course, is one major factor behind the operation
of each of the Communities:
It would be contrary to the nature of such a system [the
Communities] to accept that the Member States may take or
maintain in force measures liable to compromise the useful
effect of the Treaty. The imperative force of the Treaty . . .
could not vary from State to State by the effect of internal acts,
without the functioning of the Community system being obstructed and the attainment of the aims of the Treaty being
48
placed in peril.
In order that the legal regime be uniform within its jurisdiction, it is necessary that the competence of actions taken pursuant
to the regime be of equal validity everywhere. Accepting the
terminology of the Court of Justice, giving each Member State
independent authority in the area of supply of nuclear materials
would be "difficult to reconcile with the elementary principle of
the certainty of the law."4 9
In view of the legal situation in Europe, the decision was
clearly correct. The Euratom Supply Agency had concluded
many long-term contracts for the supply of materials to Member
States, none of which contained a provision for novation in the
event the Supply Agency died. To have invalidated such agreements by deposing the Agency would have created an intolerable
situation. Generally, the significance of the concept of uniform
application is that the Court has relied upon it to assert the preemptive authority of Community institutions.
The above analysis of the doctrine of preemption was based
upon the substantive holding of the Court. In addition to this
holding, there were two procedural findings which further emphasize the preemptive position of the Supply Agency.
The first of these involved France's argument that the Commission of the European Communities knew of the French position on the legal situation in 1965 but did not begin proceedings
before the Court of Justice until 1970. Thus, argued France,
the Commission had permitted France to put itself in a position
of alleged breach of the Treaty when it could have avoided the
48. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100, 119 (1969).
49. Commission of the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 453, 462 (1972).
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situation by submitting an application to the Court at an early
date.50
The Court did not accept this argument; nor did it limit
itself to the narrow position that the Treaty nowhere establishes
a period of limitation such as that urged by France. Rather,
it went on to say:
The uncertainty of the legal situation in which a Member
State finds itself . . . cannot be invoked to justify a breach. 5 x
By using this broad language, the Court seems to imply that
in exercising the functions delegated to it, an institution (here,
the Supply Agency) is not subject to a defense of laches. The
powers granted by the Treaty are therefore permanent--even if
not exercised-and self-help by the Member States is not
permitted..
The second procedural argument urged by France was
closely associated with the foregoing point, but was broader in
scope. The contention was that the supply provisions of the Euratom Treaty has never had any useful application since the
expected demand for nuclear materials had failed to materialize,
in having it
and "that there could not therefore be any 5 point
2
established that France has not observed them.
This contention flies directly in the face of the concept of
the continuing preemptive authority of the Supply Agency. In
his opinion, the Advocate General failed to meet this issue
squarely. Rather, the opinion dispensed with the French argument by disputing the conclusion that the Treaty provisions had
never had useful application. The Court of Justice also disputed
the facts alleged by France, but went beyond this factor to conclude:
[T]he fact that for a certain period the market conditions made
the use of the supply system provided by the Treaty less
necessary does not suffice to deprive the provisions relating to
53
that system of their binding force.
In this analysis of the legal system, the Court is stating that the
preemptive powers exercised by European institutions cannot
be diluted by events other than constitutional change.
The Court concluded that the twin factors of the system's
50. Id., at 457-58 (opinion of Advocate General).

51. Id., at 477.
52. Id., at 464 (opinion of Advocate General).
53. Id., at 475.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

15

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 [], Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 4

experimental nature and the requirement for uniformity mandated
the need for preemptive powers to be granted to the Supply
Agency; and the exercise of these powers could not be diluted
or prevented by either the concept of laches or by the failure of
anticipated events to occur. It thus affirmed its earlier statement
of this principle of preemption:
[E]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, lays down common
rules, whatever form they may take, the Member States no
longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively,
to contract obligations toward non-Member States affecting
54
these rules.
France was held in breach of its Treaty obligations since it had
assumed powers permanently delegated to a Community institution.
C.

The Permanenceof Community Institutions

In analyzing the case of Commission of the European Communities v. France, major emphasis has been placed upon the
sovereign nature of the institutions established in the Communities, and the preemptive nature of the powers exercised by those
institutions. These two aspects of the case, when viewed together,
lead to a final broad conclusion: that unless altered by a constitutional change, the institutions which have been created in Europe
are of a permanent nature, regardless of their relative dignity
vis-4-vis the Member States.
While the Court used the need for uniform application of
the rules of the Treaty as a justification for its decision, it did
not view the failure of the Euratom Supply Agency to act in
this regard as a matter of great concern. However, it viewed
the possibility that there could be a disintegration of the institutional structure of the Community with what seems to approach
abject horror.5 5 Therefore, the conclusion was quite properly
reached that a reversion of powers to the Member States, accompanied by the disestablishment of a Treaty institution, "alone
could occur by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty."5 6
54. Collinson, supra note 40, at 957.

55. Since adoption of the French position "would entail temporary disintegration" of the institutional regime, "it can scarcely be conceived that the authors of the Treaty could have intended this to occur .... ." Commission of

the European Communities v. France, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 453, 463 (1972).
56. Id., at 475.
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It must be remembered that the particular institution involved in this decision was not one of the major Community
institutions. As noted earlier, the Supply Agency is of a "secondary" nature, responsible to the major institutions. The distaste
with which the Court viewed "disintegration" of the supply regime did not involve the major workings of the European Atomic
Energy Community, but rather a secondary institution which, it
would appear from the Treaty, need not necessarily have been
granted the permanent authority implied by the Court.
Therefore, the important conclusion toward which the Court
seems to be moving is that the power of the Community may
be permanently vested in secondary institutions; and, that in the
event of a clash of asserted responsibilities involving those powers
between a State and the lower institution, the rules of that institution "take precedence irrespective of the level of the two orders
at which the conflict occurs. ' ' , 7 Such a conclusion would present
a dramatic advance for the proposition that Europe is moving
toward a federal system in which powers formerly exercised by
the Member States may not only be permanently exercised by
the major institutions, but may be redelegated by those institutions
to a lower order of the functionaries whose decisions will be no
less binding on the Member States.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The case of Commission of the European Communities v.
France presented a large number of issues which could be discussed. I have chosen to emphasize the aspects of the case which
have the broadest impact on the entire operation of the European Communities. Insofar as that operation is concerned, the
case clearly represents an advance for proponents of a federalized
Europe. However, in one aspect, the Court did not step out
as far as may have been possible.
France's major contention was that after 1965 the provisions
of Chapter VI ceased to have applicability. Yet the fact remains
that following this alleged end of the Supply Agency's authority,
the French Government continued to recognize and utilize the
Supply Agency's activities and competence-nowhere in the case
was this factor recognized.
French acquiescence in the Agency's operations occurred in
57. Sasse, supra note 34, at 717.
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a number of ways. First, in executing contracts with foreign
suppliers of nuclear materials, the French C.E.A. recognized the
Supply Agency's authority by acquiescing in the Agency's concurrent execution of the contracts.58 Moreover, following the
alleged expiration of the Agency's authority, the French continued to utilize the supply regime established in contracts between
the United States and the Supply Agency to which France was
not a party. And yet, apparently no argument was raised that
France was precluded from denying the authority of the Agency
based upon its activities in this regard.
The upshot of this apparent anomaly may be that the Court
of Justice is not yet ready to fully implement a regime which
would irrevocably place the Member States of Euratom in an
inferior position to the Community's institutions. To have held
that the French Government was estopped to assert the invalidity
of a secondary European institution would have been a further
broadening of the already wide preemptive power of the institutions of the Communities. Thus, the continental regime continues to advance, but at a pace which remains moderate.

58. Contracts between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the CEA
for the supply of enriched uranium are also executed by the Euratom Supply
Agency.
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